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VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
ABSTRACT 
The Kingdom of Tonga is the last remaining kingdom in the Pacific and has enjoyed undisturbed autonomous 
rule for many centuries. It has never been conquered or colonised by any foreign power. Its form of government 
is therefore moulded on Tongan culture and has been unchanged since it was established under the Tongan 
Constitution in 1875. Recent developments in the judiciary and the executive however have launched Tonga 
into an evolutionary process. Based on the recent judicial and executive developments, the history of Tongan 
governance and the current political climate, it is assessed that the evolutionary process should consider cultural 
identity, shared governance, good governance and judicial independence as a basis for future government. It is 
however cautioned that the evolution should not be made in haste. 
WORD COUNT: The text of this paper (excluding title page, abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 15,275 words. 
Public Law-Constitutional-Royal Prerogatives. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The Kingdom of Tonga is the last remaining kingdom in the Pacific and has enjoyed 
autonomous rule for centuries. It has never been subjected to control by a foreign power. In 
1875 modem Tonga was created when King Siaosi Tupou I granted the existing Tongan 
Constitution. Tupou I achieved this after unifying Tonga under his rule using Christianity as 
his banner. The government created under the Tongan Constitution is a constitutional 
government "under" the Tongan Monarchy. It has the three normal limbs of the Executive, 
the Legislative Assembly and the Judiciary. 
The Executive is headed by the Monarch as the chair of the Privy Council. The Privy 
Council consists of all the Ministers of the Crown and two Governors, who are all appointed 
and retain office at the whim of the Monarchy. The daily administration and implementation 
of Executive policy however rests with Cabinet, which is chaired by the Prime Minister, and 
consists of the Ministers and the two Governors. The unicameral Legislative Assembly 
comprises of the Cabinet, along with nine representatives elected by around 100,000 people, 
and nine representatives elected by 29 nobles who hold the 33 noble titles. The Judiciary is 
independent and consists of a three-tier court structure, with expatriate judges sitting in the 
highest court, the Court of Appeal, and the penultimate court, the Supreme Court. Tonga is 
therefore unique in having a Monarchy that is the Head of State, the Head of the Executive, 
and the cultural head of the people and the land. This form of government has remained 
unchanged in the last 130 years. 
In the last three decades however some controversial Executive decisions has created 
political dissension which has developed into a popular political reform movement. Political 
tension reached high levels in 2003 and 2004 when Executive decisions and legislation were 
challenged in the Tongan judiciary. 1 The ensuing judicial decisions clarified that the 
Monarch's political authority was limited by the Constitution. This provided a further 
platform for the political reformists. The Monarch and the Executive however decided to look 
internally and, surprisingly, reconfigured the constitution of the Executive by appointing four 
1 Clause 82 of the Tongan Constitution provides that: "The Constitution is the supreme law of the Kingdom and 
if any other law is inconsistent with the Constitution, that other Jaw shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
void." Clause 90 provides the Supreme Court jurisdktion in all cases in "Law and Equity arising under the 
Constitution and Laws of the Kingdom": The Act of Constitution of Tonga (Cap. 2)(as amended) Laws ofTonga 
(1988 Revised Edition) [The Constitution] 
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elected Ministers to sit in Cabinet and the Privy Council. It was unexpected and welcomed by 
most people. However, calls for further political reform still exist, and is more vociferous, 
direct and prevalent than before. The obvious result is that Tonga is experiencing 
constitutional evolution. The challenge is to evolve peacefully. The question then is: Where 
to now? 
Part II of this paper will discuss the recent constitutional developments in Tonga and 
identify governance principles from these developments that may be used in the future. In 
Part III the history of Tongan governance and the present form and operation of the Tongan 
government will be briefly outlined, together with an assessment of the political climate. The 
purpose is to fully understand where the evolution is moving from, and whether there are 
some principles to retain. In Part IV some principles of governance that could be considered 
for the future will be adduced from the recent developments, the history of Tongan 
governance and the present political climate. Options for the structure of government will 
then be discussed together with the ways in which these changes may be implemented. 
It will be suggested that Tonga's form of government should provide for cultural 
identity, shared governance, good governance and judicial independence. Tonga may either: 
fully provide for these principles in the present system; have a government based on 
partnership between the Monarchy, the nobles and the people; or, embrace full democracy 
with limited involvement of the Monarch. It will ultimately be suggested that the significant 
constitutional changes in the future should not be made in haste. 
It is not within the scope of this paper to pass judgment upon the decisions made by 
the Tongan Government in the course of the developments that are discussed here. They are 
referred to only for the purposes of analysing how the Tongan system of Government may be 
evolving. All Governments evolve, and the Tongan government is no exception. While the 
paper does discuss options for change it is not intended to provide a systematic critique of 
any proposal or to pass any relative judgments on them from a normative point of view. The 
end point of the evolution never arrives. Constitutions are a continuous work in progress. 
Rather, the paper is concerned to relate what has occurred in recent times to the constitutional 
heritage and culture of Tonga. The hope is that this may clarify the issues that are under 
debate in Tonga. 
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II RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TONGA 
A The Judiciary: Guardians of the Constitution 
1 The Lali Media Cases 
In February 2003 the Tongan Government decided to ban the Auckland published 
newspaper Taimi 'o Tonga (Taimi) from circulation in Tonga. This was based on a report 
submitted to Cabinet by the Special Branch of the Ministry of Police that the Taimi was 
responsible for stirring seditious feelings among the population.2 The Taimi was a persistent 
and outspoken political critic focussing on exposing corruption, particularly involving 
Government. 
The Government issued four bans. The first ban was under section 34 of the Customs 
and Excise Act which gives the Chief Commissioner of Revenue a wide power to prohibit the 
importation of any goods. The Chief Commissioner advised the Taimi that the ban was 
necessary because the Taimi was a foreign owned and published paper involved in domestic 
politics, and that it's standard of journalism was unacceptable. The second ban, issued the 
next day, was a Declaration published in the Government Gazette under section 35 and 
Schedule II Part 1(7) of the Customs and Excise Act made again by the Chief Commissioner 
of Revenue declaring that "all editions, volumes or part" of the Taimi to be "seditious or 
advocating violence, lawlessness or disorder" and therefore a prohibited import. Both bans 
were discussed by Cabinet beforehand and referred to the Chief Commissioner for 
consideration. 
The third ban was an Order-in-Council issued some days later by the Privy Council. 
The Order-in-Council declared that under section 3 of the Prohibited Publications Act the 
2 Under section 47(1) of the Criminal Offences Act (Cap. 18) (as amended) Laws of Tonga (1988 Revised 
Edition) every person who "speaks any seditious words or makes, publishes, imports or distributes any seditious 
document or is a party to a seditious conspiracy" commits an offence punishable by a term of imprisonment not 
more than 7 years. Under sub-section (2) "seditious words are words expressive of a "seditious intention". 
Section 48 defines "seditious intention" as "an intention to do any of the following matters: (a) to excite 
disaffection against the King of Tonga or against the Government of Tonga or Legislative Assembly or 
Judiciary in Tonga; (b) to excite such hostility or ill-will between different classes of the inhabitants of the 
Kingdom as may be injurious to the public welfare; (c) to incite, encourage or procure violence, disorder or 
resistance to law or lawlessness in the Kingdom; (d) to procure otherwise that by lawful means the alteration of 
any matter affecting the Constitution, Laws or Government of the Kingdom". 
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importation of the Taimi was contrary to the public interest.3 The Government advised the 
Taimi that, in addition to the reasons for the first ban, this ban was based on the Taimi 
advocating against the Monarchy and the Tongan Government seditious feelings, violence, 
lawlessness and disorder, and that there were complaints from various groups. 
The Taimi filed judicial review proceedings in the Supreme Court against the Chief 
Commissioner and the Government. 4 In the judgment of the Court delivered on 4 April 2003 
Chief Justice Gordon Ward clarified that under judicial review proceedings it was not the 
function of the Court to determine the merits of the allegations that the Taimi had advocated 
seditious feelings, violence, lawlessness or disorder. 5 In dealing with the first two bans the 
Chief Justice held that the Chief Commissioner had not used his powers as a "back door 
method of press censorship" however the Chief Commissioner had issued the first two bans 
based on media and political concerns, which were irrelevant factors to be considered when 
exercising the statutory powers under the Customs and Excise Act, and so had therefore acted 
ultra vires. 6 The Chief Justice also held that the actual decision was not made by the Chief 
Commissioner but by Cabinet and the Chief Commissioner was simply implementing 
Cabinet's desire.7 The Chief Justice generally agreed that the statutory powers could not ban 
future publications but did not make a clear ruling as it was not argued fully. 
In relation to the Order-in-Council the Chief Justice had, first, to deal with the issue of 
whether the Court had a right to review a decision of the Privy Council. The Chief Justice 
stated that Tonga was "unusual" compared to other countries because the King is "clearly 
included in the executive arm of Government" and it seemed that this was deliberate since the 
granting of the Constitution in 1875.8 The Court therefore ruled that the executive decisions 
of the Privy Council may be reviewed by the Courts. The Chief Justice went on to hold that 
3 Under section 3(1) of the Prohibited Publications Act (Cap. 54) Laws of Tonga (1988 Revised Edition) His 
Majesty in Council may prohibit the importation of any publication if it is contrary to the public interest. 
4 The structure of the Tongan judiciary consists of 3 levels: (1) the Court of Appeal (all appeals), the Privy 
Council (appeals from the Land Court concerning hereditary estates and titles only); (2) the Supreme Court 
(Criminal, Civil, Admiralty and Family Jurisdiction) and the Land Court (Land matters only), (3) the 
Magistrates' Court (Summary Criminal and Civil matters, and may also sit as Court of Marine Inquiry, Prisons 
Court of Inquiry and Police Tribunal). 
s La/i Media Group Ltd & 'Akau'ola v 'Utoikamanu & The Kingdom of Tonga [2003] TOSC 14, 21 
<http://www.paclii.org> (last accessed 24 August 2005) [La/i Media I]. 
6 Lali Media I, above n 5, 23. 
7 Lali Media I, above n 5, 24. 
8 lali Media I, above n 5, 9-11. 
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the Order-in-Council was based on the same reasons as the first two bans and concluded 
that:9 
The evidence demonstrates that the decision by Privy Council was not based on a proper 
consideration of the matters relevant to the decision about the public interest and further that 
the failure to discuss it and simply approve the decision of Cabinet was not a proper exercise 
of the Council's discretionary power under the Act. 
The Chief Justice also held that the Chief Commissioner and the Privy Council had 
failed to provide the Taimi with the "right to know the charges against it" and the "right to be 
given a fair opportunity to answer them". 10 The Order-in-Council was therefore held 
unlawful. 
The Plaintiffs also claimed that the statutory powers used to produce the bans were 
unconstitutional as they were inconsistent with clause 7 of the Constitution. Clause 7 
provides that: 11 
It shall be lawful for all people to speak write and print their opinions and no law shall ever be enacted 
to restrict this liberty. There shall be freedom of speech and of the press for ever but nothing in this 
clause shall be held to outweigh the law of defamation or the laws, official secrets or the laws for the 
protection of the King and the Royal Family. 
The Chief Justice declined to make such a ruling in relation to sections 34 and 35 and 
the Schedule to the Customs and Excise Act because a proper exercise of the statutory 
powers would not breach clause 7. 12 However, in dealing with the constitutionality of section 
3 of the Prohibited Publications Act, the Chief Justice held that section 3 was not inconsistent 
with clause 7 of the Constitution per se but it would be inconsistent where an Order-in-
Council made pursuant to that section failed to set out ''the factors relevant to determine the 
public interest".13 This meant that all Orders made under section 3 had to set out the reasons 
such an Order was made in the public interest. All three bans were therefore lifted. 
9 Lali Media I, above n 5, 24-27. 
w Lali Media I, above n 5, 28. 
11 Before 2003 there was only one amendment to this clause in 1990 when official secrets was inserted as an 
exception by the Act of Constitution of Tonga (Amendment) Act 1990. 
12 Lali Media I, above n 5, 34. 
13 lali Media I, above n 5, 35. 
8 
However, on the date of the Chief Justice's judgment Government promulgated a 
fourth ban in the form of an Ordinance made by the Privy Council under section 7(a) and (d) 
of the Government Act, and clause 50(1) of the Constitution. The Ordinance was titled the 
"Protection from Abuse of Press Freedom Ordinance" which effectively prohibited the Taimi 
from importation and circulation in Tonga. The Ordinance also prohibited any judicial review 
of a decision by Cabinet to ban a publication. 
Clause 50(1) of the Constitution provides that: 
(I) The King shall appoint a Privy Council to assist him in the discharge of hfa important functions. 
The Privy Council shall be composed of the Cabinet in accordance with the fifty-first clause and 
the Governors in accordance with the fifty-fourth clause and any others whom the King shall see 
fit to call to his Council. No Ordinance which may be passed by the King and Privy Council shall 
have any effect until the signature of the minister to whose department such Ordinance relates is 
affcxed thereto and if such Ordinance shall be illegal such minister alone shall be responsible and 
when the legislative Assembly shall meet it may confirm or amend such Ordinances and make 
them law or rescind them. [Emphasis added] 
Section 7 of the Government Act provides that: 14 
The King and the Privy Council may between the meetings of the Legislative Assembly pass 
Ordinances -
(a) enacting reguJations which may be required in consequence of circumstances arising between 
meetings of the Legislative Assembly; or . .. 
( d) enforcing the prerogative of the king which may have been proposed by the King; 
Again judicial review proceedings were filed in the Supreme Court by the Taimi but 
this time it was against all the Privy Councillors, except the King. 15 In dealing with the 
argument the Ordinance was based on section 7(a) of the Government Act Chief Justice Ward 
in hisjudgment of26 May 2003 stated: 16 
14 Government Act (Cap. 3)(as amended) laws of Tonga (1988 Revised Edition) [Government Act] 
15 Lali Media & Others v Prince 'Ulukalala Lavaka Ata & Others & The Kingdom of Tonga [2003] TOSC 30 
<http://wwwpaclii.org> (last accessed 24 August 2005) [Lali Media II] . The King was excluded out of respect. 
16 Lali Media II, above n 15, 8-9. 
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The modem position of the prerogative is that it is limited by the common law and the 
Monarch can claim no prerogative that the law does not allow. When the prerogative is 
defined by statute, as occurs in our Constitution, it is thereafter subject to that law. 
The Ordinance did not enforce any personal prerogative of the King and insofar as Privy 
Council passed it under subsection (d) it was clearly ultra vires the section and is therefore 
void. 
In relation to section 7(d) the Chief Justice held that "there was no circumstance 
which had arisen requiring an Ordinance". 17 The Plaintiffs also claimed that the statutory 
powers used to produce the Ordinance was contrary to clause 7 however the Chief Justice 
held that they were not inconsistent with the Constitution, although the way they were used 
was unconstitutional. 18 
Government appealed both Supreme Court decisions to the Court of Appeal. 
19 On 25 
July 2003 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and confirmed the decisions of the Chief 
Justice. In relation to the first two bans the Court of Appeal held that sections 34 and 35 of 
the Customs and Excise Act "could not ban future editions of a newspaper".2
0 In relation to 
the Order-in-Council the Court found it sufficient to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the 
Taimi was denied naturaljustice.21 
In dealing with the Ordinance the Court made two observations concerning clause 50 
of the Constitution. First, the Court held that:22 
[clause 50] does not lend support to any idea that an Ordinance may be passed under some 
prerogative power outside the ordinary operation of the Constitution; on the contrary, the 
Ordinances to which it refers do not have "any effect" except upon compliance with the 
Constitution, and it is expressly contemplated that a particular Ordinance may be found to "be 
illegal", in which case the relevant minister is made "responsible". 
The second point was that:23 
17 Lali Media ll, above n 15, 9-10 
18 La/i Media ll, above n 15, l0-12. 
19 'Utoikamanu and ors v lali Media and ors [2004] TOCA 6 <http://wwwpaclii.org> (last accessed 24 August 
2005) [Loli Media Ill]. 
20 Lali Media 111, above n 19, 8. 
21 Lali Media 111, above n I 9, 1 I. 
22 la/i Media 111, above n I 9, 14. 
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... Clause 50 regulates the making of Ordinances which the King and Privy Council are 
otherwise empowered to make; it is not itself an independent source of power. That is quite 
clear from the words "which may be passed", words assuming that power has been granted in 
a particular case to pass an Ordinance. For the grant of power, it is necessary to go to a law 
enacted, as clause 56 provides, by the King and the Legislative Assembly, the law making 
body under the Constitution. An Ordinance made pursuant to an Act is, of course, a form of 
delegated legislation, and its validity will be subject to review on that basis ... The purported 
exclusion of judicial review in certain cases cannot be effective to prevent the Supreme Court 
exercising its constitutional function of determining whether or not there has been violation of 
the Constitution. 
In dealing with the legality of the Ordinance the Court of Appeal held that ''there was 
no evidence that this was an Ordinance that had been proposed by the King", and it was not 
possible ''to see in the Ordinance an enforcement of any prerogative"; also "there is no 
prerogative power to ban the publications of opinions or information". 24 The Court also 
opined that there was "no evidence of any circumstances arising between meetings of the 
Legislative Assembly" that could have justified the Ordinance.25 
In dealing with the constitutionality of the Ordinance the Court of Appeal 
interestingly held that the Ordinance was not punishment without trial contrary to clause 10 
of the Constitution as pleaded by the Taimi, however the Ordinance did breach clause 7 of the 
Constitution and stated that:26 
In a system of responsible government which includes the participation of regularly elected 
representatives of the people and of the nobles, public discussion is an essential element.... 
These three judicial decisions had constitutional significance regarding the structure 
and procedure of the Executive. First, the judiciary confirmed that the direct involvement of 
the Monarchy in Executive decision making was subject to judicial scrutiny. Decisions made 
by the Privy Council are decisions of the King and the Privy Councillors as a whole. The 
implication of the decision was that if the Monarchy is involved in Executive decision 
23 Lali Media Ill, above n 19, 15. 
24 Lali Media ll/, above n 19, 15. 
25 Lali Media Ill, above n 19, 15. 
26 La/i Media lll, above n 19, 16-17. 
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making that can be challenged and struck down by the judiciary, political dissension may rise 
to unprecedented levels threatening the Monarchy's stature among its subjects. 
Secondly, the courts clarified that the Monarch's royal and legal prerogatives are 
limited by the Constitution in their source and use, particularly in relation to the Monarch and 
the Executive's law making powers. This was a critical statement on the Monarch's 
prerogative powers, and naturally staunch royalists viewed the decision as concerning. 27 
However to most the decision was well received because it confirmed that the Tongan 
Constitution remained a check on executive government. The Taimi was allowed back into 
Tonga and continued its circulation. But that was short lived. 
2 The Constitutional Case 
After the Court of Appeal confirmed the bans on the Taimi were unlawful in July 
2003, Government decided to regulate the media to ensure the public received a high 
standard of journalism. Government thus introduced three bills to the Legislative Assembly: 
the Act of Constitution of Tonga (Amendment) Bill 2003, which proposed eight additional 
limitations to freedom of speech and press28, the power to enact laws to regulate the media, 
and that the remedy for breach of the Constitution to be a declaration only; the Media 
Operators Bill 2003, which proposed that operation of media outlets be limited to Tongans or 
corporations with majority shareholdings held by Tongans; and the Newspaper Bill 2003, 
which proposed the establishment of a licensing regime for licensing newspapers including 
the power to control contents of a newspaper. The Bills were passed by the Assembly in 
October 2003. Cabinet and Privy Council unanimously approved the Bills in November 2003 
and the King gave Royal Assent at the end of November 2003, giving the three bills legal 
force.29 
In response, over 150 plaintiffs, including a number of political reformist campaigners 
generically known as the 'pro-democracy movement', issued judicial review proceedings 
27 Matangi Tonga Online "Tonga's law are there to protect the people who have no power: Justice Ward" 2 July 
2004 <http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 18 July 2005) [Ward Interview] 
28 Clause 7 of the Constitution already provided limitations for the law of defamation, official secrets and laws 
~rotecting the King and the RoyaJ Family. 
9 A petition was submitted to the Legislative Assembly not to pass the Bills. When this failed another petition 
was submitted to the King not to give royaJ assent. 
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challenging the validity of the Acts. 3
0 The essence of the action was however the 
constitutionality of the Acts and the case was referred to as the "Constitutional case". The 
Plaintiffs claimed that the three Acts infringed the entrenched freedom of speech and press 
(freedom of expression) contained in clause 7 of the Constitution, and their enactment 
breached clause 79 of the Constitution which provides for the amendment of the Constitution 
as follows: 
[t shall be lawful for the Legislative Assembly to discuss amendments to the Constitution 
provided that such amendments shall not affect the law of liberty the succession to the Throne 
and the titles and hereditary estates of the nobles. And if the Legislative Assembly wish to 
amend any clause of the Constitution such amendment shall after it has passed the Legislative 
Assembly three times be submitted to the King and if the Privy Council and the Cabinet are 
unanimously in favour of the amendment it shall be lawful for the King to assent and when 
signed by the King it shall become law. [Emphasis added] 
An amendment to the Constitution is normally instigated by the Executive through a 
policy directive. It may originate as a result of a directive from the Monarch, a proposal from 
a Minister or as a result of a court ruling. 31 In this case the decision to amend the Constitution 
was proposed by Cabinet and was furthered with the approval of the Monarch, which at this 
time was occupied by the Crown Prince as Prince Regent. 
On 8 October 2004 Tonga's new Chief Justice, Robin Webster MBE, handed down 
his judgment together with a summary for the benefit of the media and the public. 
32 The 
Chief Justice first clarified the status of Tonga's legislature which consists of the King and 
the Legislative Assembly:33 
30 Taione and ors v Kingdom of Tonga [2004] TOSC 48 <http://wwwpaclii .org> (last accessed 24 August 2005) 
ff aTih·one] al s:: din I · I · · 1· d. · · · d b C b. th th · e norm process 1or or ary eg1s at1on 1s: a po icy rrectrve 1s issue y a met, en e matter 1s 
referred to the Crown Law Department to draft the amendment in English and Tongan. The draft is then 
submitted to the Law Committee for vetting. It is then submitted to Cabinet and then Privy Council for approval 
for tabling before the Legislative Assembly. The amendment must be passed by simple majority three times by 
the Assembly. [t is then returned to the Cabinet and Privy Council for unanimous approval. The final version of 
the Bill is then submitted to the Monarch for Royal Assent. After Royal Assent is given the Act is returned to 
the Prime Minister' s Office for promulgation in the Government Gazette. If the bill is an amendment to the 
Constitution the only difference is that there is a requirement for "unanimous approval" in Cabinet and the Privy 
Council before submission to the Monarch for Royal Assent. 
~
2 Chief Justice Ward resigned in April 2003 and left in June 2003 to take up the post of President of the Court 
of Appeal of Fiji. The reasons for his resignation are discussed below. 
33 Taione, above n 30, 16. 
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... in Tonga the legislature has supreme power to enact laws but, unlike the Westminster 
Parliament ... that is not an unfettered power because Tonga has a written Constitution, so the 
legislature can only make laws within the terms of the Constitution and its powers within the 
Constitution. 
The Legislature's power to enact laws includes power under Clause 79 of the Constitution to 
amend the Constitution itself, but only according to the terms of Clause 79 of the Constitution, 
and in particular any restrictions contained in it as to the procedure to be followed and any 
specially protected provisions, ie entrenched provisions. 
The Chief Justice then set out the principles for determining whether the Constitution 
has been validly amended. 34 When the Chief Justice came to interpret the Constitution he 
held that Tongan culture was not a relevant factor for interpretation, "except to the extent that 
it formed part of the context when the Constitution was adopted in 1875" and so it had to be 
interpreted in a Western sense. 35 The Court also held that the context of and circumstances 
giving rise to the Lali Media cases were "neutral and not of any particular help in relation to 
consideration of the amendments to the Constitution".36 
In dealing with the Constitution (Amendment) Act 2003 the Chief Justice held that 
the exceptions introduced to the right to freedom of expression in clause 7 of the Constitution 
concerning "national security", "public order", "morality", "parliamentary privilege" and 
"contempt of Court" did not breach the entrenched provisions of clauses 7 and 79 because 
they were fetters on that right recognised by the common law. 
37 The Chief Justice however 
established a caveat of necessity by stating that: 
But I add the rider . . . that the sub-clause may only allow laws to be made if they are 
necessary in terms of a pressing social need, provided they are no more than proportionate to 
the legitimate aim being pursued and do not involve prior restraint of freedom of expression 
except in cases of clear and present danger. I repeat, and emphasise as important, that any 
individual law made under the umbrella of sub-clause (2) [the new exceptions] would have to 
fall properly within those standards and it would always be liable for scrutiny for 
inconsistency in terms of Clause 82 of the Constitution [power to strike down laws 
inconsistent with the Constitution]. 
34 Taione, above n 30, l 7. 
~
5 Taione, above n 30, 26. 
36 Taione, above n 30, 28. 
37 
Taione, above n 30, 32-33. 
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The Chief Justice added the same caveat to sub-clause (3), which makes it lawful to 
enact laws to regulate the media, after he held that sub-clause (3) was not inconsistent with 
clause 7.38 
However the Court held that the "public interest", "cultural traditions" and "the 
commission of offences" exceptions to clause 7 "did not come within the common law 
understanding of implied exceptions to freedom of expression" because "they may restrict 
and will inevitably affect the freedoms of expression, and so conflict with the entrenching 
provisions and absolute prohibitions" in clauses 7 and 79.
39 
The Chief Justice also went on to hold that the Media Operators Act was inconsistent 
with clause 7 because "it prevents certain people from exercising freedom of the Press, and 
thus prevents the public from having access to information and comment freely".
40 In relation 
to the Newspaper Act the Chief Justice held that substantial parts of the Act "are clearly in 
direct conflict with and inconsistent with clause 7".
41 
Two points of relevance require attention from the case. The Chief Justice did not use 
Tongan culture to interpret the Constitution because Tongan culture is not mentioned in the 
Constitution, nor was it supported by Tongan case law.
42 The decision of the Chief Justice 
was not only supported by the text of the Constitution but also the historical context in which 
the Constitution was adopted in 1875. As will be discussed below, the Constitution was 
intended primarily to fend off colonial aspirations relating to Tonga through recognition by 
the colonial powers of Tonga's sovereignty and independence. A Constitution that provided 
Western notions of rights and a western model of government provided the basis for that 
desired recognition. However, Western notions of freedom and human rights were absolutely 
mysterious to Tongan culture around this time. It was only when Christianity and Western 
education started to mature in the early 1900s that rights became fully indulged by Tongan 
culture. The implication is that the place of Tongan culture in Tongan laws has to be 
considered in order to maintain laws in Tonga are Tongan. Obviously there will be conflicts 
38 Taione, above n 30, 35. 
39 Taione, above n 30, 33-34. 
40 Taione, above n 30, 37-38. 
41 Taione, above n 30, 40. 
42 Taione, above n 30, 26. 
15 
between Tongan culture and principles of law. However that is outside the scope of this 
paper. Suffice to say for the purposes of this paper that the Constitution has provided political 
authority in a cultural context by giving the Monarchy a central political role. 
Secondly, the Chief Justice recognised that it was not an easy task for the Courts to 
strike down legislation when he stated: 43 
. . . [ very much regret having to make such a finding in relation to legislation which has had the 
approval of the Legislative Assembly, the Cabinet, the Privy Council and His Majesty The King, but 
again it is the clear duty of this Court under the Constitution to do so and thus to uphold the 
Constitution. 
The judgment cemented judicial independence in Tonga in a case which may be 
simply the most important judicial case ever in Tonga's legal history. The case also 
symbolised the height of the on-going political tension that exists between the Executive and 
the political reformists. Although the political reformers had won in stopping the media 
reforms, the more significant result was that the whole of Tonga had won, including the 
Executive. This was because the judiciary had upheld the Constitution and again confirmed 
that the Tongan form of government works. Although the Executive holds overwhelming 
political power, the judiciary is an effective check on Executive power through the 
Constitution. At the end of the case freedoms were intact. The Executive accepted the result. 
Both parties found it unnecessary to appeal the new Chief Justice's decision. 
B The Executive: Changing Ministers 
1 Cabinet Reshuffees 
In August 2004 His Royal Highness the Prime Minister asked three Cabinet Ministers 
to resign. 44 In effect these were dismissals that were termed "Government's proposed 
43 Taione, above n 30, 41. 
44 They were: Hon. William Clive Edwards, Minister of Police, Prisons and Fire Services; Hon. Masasso Paunga 
Minister of Labour, Commerce and Industries; and Hon. 'Aisea Taumoepeau, Attorney General and Minister of 
Justice. 
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reorganisation to incorporate economic development". 45 The Ministers had disagreed with 
economic policies proposed by the Prime Minister. One of the Ministers who resigned 
claimed they were asked to resign because of their opposition to a 'one domestic airline 
policy' that the Executive had approved.46 A reshuffling then followed with new Ministerial 
appointments. 47 
Two points with this reshuffling are of constitutional significance. First, there was 
some doubt as to who actually decided to dismiss the Ministers. 48 One of the Ministers asked 
to resign claimed that the decision was ''unlawful" because it was not a decision of the King, 
and under the Constitution only the King could dismiss Ministers.49 This claim created heated 
public debate and, in an unprecedented way, His Royal Highness the Crown Prince became 
involved, providing a fascinating and rare insight to the workings of the high-levels of the 
Executive. so There was also a sense of uncertainty within Government and also the public as 
to who actually was running the country. 
Secondly, a sense of uncertainty infected the Ministers who were reminded firsthand 
that their mandates were not for life, as perceived by some. The last major sacking of 
Ministers occurred in September 2001 when two Ministers were both asked to resign over the 
failed investment of the Tonga Trust Fund in the United States.51 
45 Matangi Tonga Online "Three Tongan Cabinet Ministers fired" 28 August 2004 
<http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 17 August 2005). 
46 Matangi Tonga Online "I was accused of a coup plot," reveals Edwards: Interview with Clive Edwards, Part 
One" 17 January 2005 <http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 11 March 2005) [Edwards Interview I) 
According to personal communication to the author by the former Attorney General and Minister of Justice he 
was told he was being asked to resign on the basis that he was responsible for the alleged misconduct by the 
Solicitor General during legal proceedings concerning the 'one domestic airline policy'. The allegation against 
the Solicitor General to date has never been processed or established. 
47 Tonga's Ambassador to the Unjted Nations, Sonatane Tu'akinamalohi Taumoepeau-Tupou was reca11ed and 
appointed Minister ofForeign Affairs. The Tongan High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, the late 
Colonel Fetu'utolu Tupou was recalled and appointed Minister of Defence. The Commissioner of Public 
Relations, Siaosi Taimani 'Aho was appointed Attorney General and Minister of Justice. The Labour, 
Commerce and Industries portfolio was assigned to the Deputy Prime Minister, Hon. Cecil Cocker. 
48 Edwards Interview L, above n 46, 2. 
49 The Constitution, above n 1, cl 51. 
50 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and William Clive Edwards, the former Minister of Police, Prisons and 
Fire Services wrote several letters to the editor on the Matangi Tonga Online website concerning the 
resignations. <http://www.matangitonga.to>. 
51 Kerry James "The Recent Elections in Tonga: Democratic Supporters Win but Does Democracy Follow?" 
(2002) 37(3) Journal of Pacific History 313,316. [James) 
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2 Elected Ministers 
The Executive's next political change was however unexpected to say the least. On 26 
November 2004, His Royal Highness the Prime Minister announced that after the March 
2005 elections the King had agreed to his "advice" to appoint two Ministers each from the 
Peoples' and Nobles' elected representatives as Ministers.52 The appointments were termed 
as "grace and favour" appointments and that their tenure of office would depend on their 
holding their electorate mandate. 
In announcing the appointments the Prime Minister stated that it would "reflect the 
democratic principles" of the Tongan Constitution, and that this was a "natural progression of 
the Kingdom's political system". Clearly the rationale behind these appointments was 
recognition of the need for participation, albeit limited in numbers, by the Peoples' and 
Nobles' Representatives in Executive decision making. It may also have been seen as an 
attempt to silence the vociferous criticism of the Executive after the media reforms and the 
forced resignations of the Ministers. 
Although welcomed with open arms by the advocates of political reform, some saw 
the appointment as "out of date" and that Ministers who feel free to "speak out" is what is 
actually needed. 53 This criticism is based on clause 83 which requires a new Ministers to take 
an oath of loyalty to the "Monarch and his Government", whereas a new Representative's 
oath is an expression of "zealously discharging ones duties as a member of the Legislative 
Assembly". A Minister is therefore, first, loyal to the Monarch and his Government. An 
elected Minister may therefore be accused of losing sight of his or her electorate. Even 
among the Peoples' Representatives there was mixed feelings with one Representative 
claiming that it was like ''worshipping two gods", and others claimed it was an "opportunity 
for the people" and the "beginning of genuine political reform, allowing people to elect their 
leaders". 54 
52 Government of Tonga Media Release "Four New Ministers from Elected Parliamentarians" 
<http://www.pmo.gov.to> (last accessed 11 March 2005). 
53 Matangi Tonga Online "Edwards rejects system of"puppet ministers" : Interview with Clive Edwards, Part 
Two" 18 January 2005 <http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 11 March 2005) 
54 Matangi Tonga Online "People's Reps differ on Ministerial appointments" 15 November 2004 
<http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 17 August 2005). 
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On 21 March 2005 His Royal Highness the Prime Minister announced the new 
appointments.55 Two Nobles' Representatives were appointed Minister of Police, Prisons and 
Fire Services56 and Minister of Works57, respectively. Two Peoples' Representatives were 
appointed Minister of Labour, Commerce and Industries 58 and Minister of Forestry 59 , 
respectively. In announcing the appointments His Royal Highness the Prime Minister 
described the day as one of "great expectations", "solidarity" and a ''time for us to further 
strengthen our co-operation as a nation". It was indeed a "new chapter in our history". After 
the appointment of the elected Ministers a by-election took place to replace the elected 
Ministers with new representatives. 60 
The appointments of the elected Ministers were quite significant. From a political 
standpoint Cabinet and Privy Council had opened its doors to two Peoples' Representatives 
who were members of the "Human Rights and Democracy Movement in Tonga", the group 
whose main objective is to advocate political reform particularly to the structure and power of 
the Executive. 61 Moreover, it was uncertain whether the new Ministers from the elected 
Nobles' Representatives would always support the Executive. The new Minister of Works, 
while the Speaker during the 2002-2004 Legislative Assembly session, had voted and spoke 
against the media reforms proposed by the Executive in the previous Parliament session. 62 
Interestingly the new Minister of Labour, Commerce and Industries was made Acting Prime 
Minister shortly after his appointment illustrating that the elected Ministers were fully 
55 Government of Tonga Media Release "Historic Ministerial Appointments from Elected Representatives to 
farliament'' <http://www.pmo.gov.to> (last accessed 22 March 2005) 
6 Hon. Nuku, the Nobles' Representative for 'Eua. 
57 Hon. Tu'ivakano, Number 1 Nobles' Representative for Tongatapu, and the Speaker of the House in the last 
Parliament Session, who is a former secondary school teacher. 
58 Dr Feleti Sevele, Number 2 Peoples' Representative for Tongatapu, owner and operator of various businesses. 
59 Sione Peauafi Haukinima, Peoples' Representative for Niuafo'ou and Niuatoputapu, who is a former civil 
servant who worked in the Forestry Division. Interestingly, under the 2004-2005 Budget the Forestry portfolio 
was combined with Agriculture as per nonnal. The separation of the portfolios illustrates an extra effort to 
~ovide an appropriate Ministerial portfolio for the Representative, but at the same time not giving him both. 
William Clive Edwards, the former Minister of Police who was asked to resign in August 2004, was elected in 
the May by-elections and is currently the Number 3 Peoples Representative for Tongatapu. With his legal and 
Ministerial background be undoubtedly will be an effective Peoples' Representative. 
6 1 Human Rights and Democracy Movement in Tonga, Brochure 2003 <http://www.planet-tonga.com> (last 
accessed 17 August 2005). 
62 Minutes of the Legislative Assembly of Tonga, Numbers 20/2003 of29 July 2003, 35-36, 51-52; 57/2003 of 
16 October 2003, 29-31; and 59/2003 of20 October 2003, 19, 24-25. Two other Nobles voted against the 
reforms including the late Hon. Ma'atu, the King' s second son, whose royal title and privileges were removed in 
1980 after he married without the King's consent, contrary to clause 33 of the Constitution. 
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embraced by the Monarchy and the Executive. 63 But it remains to be seen whether such early 
expression of trust means that the elected Ministers have been lost from their electorate. 64 
Secondly, the new Ministers increased the number of the Cabinet from the traditional 
membership of 12 to 16.65 As will be discussed below, this gives the Executive further voting 
strength in the Legislative Assembly. Thirdly, from an economic and social perspective the 
portfolios granted to the People's Representatives meant placing a large portion of the 
economy in the hands of the political reformists. 
C Beginning of Political Evolution 
The consequence of these developments is that Tonga's structure of Government is 
undoubtedly evolving, particularly its Executive branch. The evolution process has been 
helped in the context of the judicial decisions in the Lali Media and Taione cases. Within a 
space of 18 months the powers under the Constitution of the King, Privy Council, Cabinet, 
the Legislative Assembly and the Judiciary were outlined and confirmed. In hindsight it was 
a peculiar foreshadowing of the political evolution. It was also timely in clarifying the legal 
framework of Tonga's government. No doubt the judicial decisions would be a compass 
during the evolution. 
It is most likely that the judicial decisions provided the instigation for the Monarchy 
and the Executive to agree to the recent developments in the Executive branch. The 
participation of elected Ministers in the Privy Council can be seen as the Monarch wanting to 
share responsibility of Executive decision making. Another view is that ingeniously the 
Monarch has eliminated the risk of being solely blamed for unpopular Government policies. 
Disaffection towards Government policies can now be laid equally at the Monarch, the 
Ministers, and the elected Ministers. Another view however is that in resigning as a Peoples' 
or Nobles' Representative and taking the oath of a Minister, the Representatives have elected 
63 Matangi Tonga Online "Dr Feleti Sevele becomes Acting Prime Minister" 2 l April 2005 
<http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 23 April 2005). 
64 The elected Ministers appointed from the Peoples Representatives recently had to publicly denounce 
criticisms that they were doing nothing for the people inside Cabinet: Matangi Tonga Online" New Ministers 
reject criticism" 22 September 2005 <http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 26 September 2005) 
65 The number however came down to 15 after the new Minister of Defence Col Fetu'utolu Tupou unexpectedJy 
died of heart failure in April 2005. The Defence portfolio was taken over by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Cabinet membership was normally at eight when there were only seven representatives in the Assembly. 
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to disengage themselves from their electorate mandate and be subjected to the whim of the 
Monarch. 
These changes however, realistically, are still experimental and should not be viewed 
as permanent, nor are they a guarantee of the direction of the evolution process. The changes 
have not been expressly provided for under the Constitution and the laws of Tonga as the 
permanent structure of the Executive, and so they may be removed as fast as they came in. 
The changes however are not inconsistent within the present legal framework. They are 
practical and politically acceptable to many, and so are likely to be given a fair opportunity to 
produce results. 
Although it is clear that the changes are part of Tonga's political evolution, it is also 
significant in proving whether change is necessary. The experimental nature of the changes 
offers an opportunity to test whether it is appropriate for Tonga to have fully, or some, 
elected Ministers. It remains to be seen whether the elected Ministers working under a fixed 
tenure of office will provide valuable, independent contributions to Executive policies. 
Attention however must be afforded to the principles that anchor these developments 
because they may be principles that the Monarchy and the Executive may engage in the 
future. What can be gathered from these developments is that representation or participation 
of the people and nobles in the Executive is acceptable. It also seems clear that firm 
accountability of Ministers is a concept that may also be acceptable. The judicial 
independence of the judiciary is also respected. Where to now? 
To answer that question we will need to look deeper into the history and structure of 
the Tongan Government to determine what Tonga is evolving from, and whether there are 
some principles that should be retained for the future. Moreover, it would also be fair to 
consider the arguments for political reform in order to consider any compromise with the 
reformists. After that, we may be able to have some perspective of where Tonga is heading, 
and maybe even, of the direction in which it should move. 
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III THE TONGAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
A Historical Background 
The Kingdom of Tonga is the sole surviving kingdom in the Pacific. Tonga's 170 
islands are divided into five island groups. The major island groups are Tongatapu, Vava'u, 
Ha'apai, with two smaller island groups of 'Eua and the Niuas. These islands have never 
been conquered or colonised by any foreign power. Tonga was once the centre of a maritime 
empire that included Niue, Samoa, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna, Rotuma and the Lau Group 
in Fiji.66 Ancient Tongan rulers were therefore accustomed to holding immense and constant 
power. 
The seat of power in this ancient empire was occupied by the Tu 'i Tonga (King of 
Tonga). They were the first kings to unify and rule over the whole of Tonga. The first Tu 'i 
Tonga, 'Aho'eitu, was believed to be the son of a god and an earthly mother. This gave the 
Tu 'i Tonga kings both temporal and spiritual status. In Tongan culture a person's social rank 
is determined by how close their lineage is to the Tu 'i Tonga bloodline. 67 In a Christian 
society this of course is not based on deity blood but on the fact that the Tu 'i Tonga title is the 
most prestigious ranked title in Tongan society, and therefore is owed the most respect from 
all Tongans. 
The Tu 'i Tonga's rule was often cruel and oppressive, which became a norm in 
ancient Tongan culture. The subjects were devoted to their rulers for the sake of survival. 
However, in return the rulers treated their subjects inhumanely as mere chattels. Tongan 
commoners therefore had absolutely no rights nor privileges. For instance, when a king or a 
chief died a handful of servants would be clubbed to death and buried with the king so the 
servants could continue their servitude in the afterlife. The Tu 'i Tonga's empire however 
began to disintegrate because of the vast maritime distances between its lands, administrative 
difficulties and the need for decentralisation of authority due to growth in population. 
66 Sione Latukefu The Tongan Constitution, A brief history to celebrate its Centenary (Tonga Traditions 
Committee Publication, Nuku'alofa, J 975) 2. 
67 Elizabeth Wood-Ellem Queen Salote of Tonga: The Story of an Era 1900-1965(Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 1999) 17-18. 
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This began the shaping of the present form of government. There are significant 
events to highlight. First, the Tongan political structure underwent radical and abrupt reform 
twice which, it should be noted, were instigated by violence. The first was a result of a 
succession of assassinations of the Tu 'i Tonga in the 15th century. This resulted in the 24th 
Tu 'i Tonga appointing his younger brother as the hau or temporal ruler to be known as the 
Tu 'i Ha 'atakalaua. The hau was charged with the daily administration of the land, while the 
Tu 'i Tonga became solely a divine leader. 
This shift of real power was repeated in the 17th century when the 6th Tu 'i 
Ha 'atakalaua decided to emulate the Tu 'i Tonga by appointing one of his sons to take over 
the responsibilities of the hau. The new temporal ruler was known as the Tu 'i Kanokupolu. 
The Tu 'i Ha 'atakalaua king was thus elevated to a ceremonial role where the Tu 'i 
Kanokupolu was responsible to governing the land and paying tribute to both the Tu 'i 
Ha 'ataka/aua and the Tu 'i Tonga. Eventually the Tu 'i Ha 'atakalaua title faded away with the 
last titleholder in 1799 and its duties were absorbed by the Tu 'i Kanokupolu office. This left 
the Tu 'i Tonga and the Tu 'i Kanokupo/u. 
Growth in population meant decentralisation of power to chiefs who by the early 18th 
century held the real power in Tongan society. The chiefs held absolute and arbitrary power 
directly over the people they were supposed to govern on behalf of the kings. Their subjects 
in tum also grew more loyal to their chiefs rather then the Tu 'i Tonga and the hau.68 The 
growth in stature of the chiefs led to power struggles among the chiefs creating a turbulent 
state of affairs between the hau and the rebelling chiefs. In the late 18th century the hau, Tu 'i 
Kanokupolu Tuku'aho, began to assert his rule over the whole of Tonga as rightly the 
temporal ruler. In 1799 however Tuk:u'aho was murdered, launching Tonga into a devastating 
civil war that would last for a century and a half. 
The second event that was to shape Tonga's form of government occurred after the 
civil war. In 1820 Tuk:u'aho's grandson, Taufa'ahau, was appointed the Tu'i Kanokupolu and 
continued his grandfather's cause to rule over the whole of Tonga. By 1852 the last of the 
civil war battles were fought and Taufa'ahau emerged victorious thus unifying the whole of 
Tonga under his rule giving prominence to the Tu 'i Kanokupolu title. Taufa'ahau was a 
68 Latukefu, above n 66, 2. 
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converted Christian and, in admiration for the English monarch of the time, King George Ill, 
he changed his name to Siaosi Tupou I (George Tupou I). Tupou I was a born leader who 
possessed legitimate lineage as King, and leadership qualities unequalled by his 
contemporaries. 69 Tupou I universally introduced 3 concepts to modernise his new nation: 
Christianity; the emancipation of commoners and the rule of codified laws. The last two 
concepts proved to be unpopular among the powerful chiefs as they lost their power base 
through emancipation of their subjects, and their arbitrary power was now restricted by 
written law. 
Tupou I recognised this disaffection and appreciated that there was a risk that civil 
war may break out if no stability was guaranteed after his death. Tupou I also recognised that 
at this time the colonial powers were vigorously colonising Tonga's neighbours. Tupou I 
therefore desired a way to end any colonial aspirations for Tonga, and ensure recognition of 
Tonga's sovereignty and independence. 
The King decided to grant his people a written Constitution which guaranteed not 
only his and his successors' rule of Tonga, but also liberty, rights, security and land for all 
Tongan people. As a result Tupou I surrendered his inherited absolute power. This event was 
not only ground breaking, but would have been a shock to the Tongans of the time. After a 
number of years of consultation with foreign lawyers, heads of states and advisors Tupou I 
introduced the final draft of the Constitution on 16 September 1875 to a meeting of the chiefs. 
At the opening of the meeting Tupou I stated: 70 
... The form of our Government in the days past was that my rule was absolute, and that my wish 
was law and that I chose who should belong to the Parliament and that I could please myself to 
create chiefs and alter titles. But that, it appears to me was a sign of darkness and now a new era 
has come to Tonga - an era of light - it is my wish to grant a Constitution and to carry on my 
duties in accordance with it and those that come after me shall do the same and the Constitution 
shaJJ be as a firm rock in Tonga for ever. 
69 Latukefu, above n 66, 18. See also Kenneth Bain The Friendly Islanders (Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 
London: 1967) 30, and Sione Latukefu "King George Tupou r of Tonga" in J W Davidson and Deryck Scarr 
Pacific islands Portraits (A.H. & A. W. Reed, Wellington: 1973) 55. 
70 HM King Siaosi Tupou I An Excerpt from the Speech of His Majesty Tupou I at the Opening of Parliament 
1875 [1923-1962] Tongan Law Reports Vol II 1, 1. 
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The chiefs passed the Constitution with minor amendments. In closing the meeting on 
4 November 1875, Tupou I stated:71 
This then is the Constitution of Tonga, written in parchment to be kept in Parliament as proof and 
in memory of the work we have done today. I attach my name to it on this day, and it is now 
become law, and may you and your descendants be bestowed with blessings from generation to 
generation as long as you embrace this constitution and may the day never dawn on which any 
Tongan would do anything to undermine it but that this constitution be the foundation stone on 
which we built, the pillar, the impregnable bastion that fortifys our country and by it may we stand 
till doomsday. May it please the Omnipotent to lend us power to fulfil these our obligations. 
Modem Tonga was thus born with its sovereignty intact and the establishment of its 
first civil government. 
The Constitution however did not necessarily ensure political stability as expected, 
although the colonial powers did recognise Tonga' sovereignty. From 1875 until the middle 
of the 20th century Tonga's form of government faced regular political opposition although 
more subtly than recently. Political opposition is therefore not a recent phenomenon in 
Tongan politics. Even in pre-Constitution years the ancient kings faced political opposition 
and used political manoeuvrings and wars to maintain their power base when required. Tupou 
I realised the disaffection of chiefs in losing their power base to emancipation and so 
alleviated some disappointment by appointing a number of chiefs as nobles. 
After the Constitution was granted, a multiple of factors existed that nearly destroyed 
years of toil by Tupou I. The Tongan constitution was a radical change to Tongan way oflife 
and government. At the time a majority of the Tongan people were yet to fully indulge 
education to understand the workings of the Constitution. More importantly a quiet 
opposition group grew out of the disgruntled chiefs who were not made nobles. Europeans at 
the time also criticised the Constitution as "unsuitable, unworkable and abortive". The 
Constitution was however not yet finalised as evidenced by a number of fine-tuning 
amendments that were made in the early years of the Constitution that included giving the 
71 HM King Siaosi Tupou I The Speech of His Majesty Tupou I at the Close of Parliament on 4th November 1875 
{1923-1962] Tongan Law Reports Vol II, 3, 3. 
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Executive more flexible powers.72 Tupou I's age also made him susceptible to influence from 
his closest advisors who took advantage of their power to deal with their enemies, resulting in 
the relegation of the Constitution to the backseat. 73 Even Government often ignored the basic 
rights entrenched in the Constitution. 74 
Added to these factors were financial woes. In 1893 Tupou I died, and was succeeded 
by his 19 year old great-grandson Taufa'ahau, who became King Siaosi Tupou II. The new 
King and his government took the country to the verge of bankruptcy. The political pressure 
from some of the disaffected chiefs was further inflamed by their disappointment with the 
King's choice of consort. It even reached the stage where some chiefs planned for the 
removal of Tupou II through the British authorities. 75 
The heightening financial, political and social problems led Tupou II to sign a treaty 
in 1900 with Great Britain where Tonga would remain a self governing state under British 
protection. Tupou II was initially reluctant to sign the treaty because he believed it usurped 
his authority. However, after threats of annexation Tupou II signed. Unfortunately matters 
did not improve. In 1905 a Supplement to the 1900 treaty was signed which basically set out 
procedures for the Tongan Government to comply with. Tupou II reluctantly signed the 
Supplement which slightly sidelined the Constitution. 76 
In 1918 Tupou II died and was succeeded by his daughter who was crowned Queen 
Salote Tupou III. Queen Salote inherited a state tense with political, financial and social 
issues. The political opponents of her father continued their subtle opposition despite 
occupying high offices in the Government. Queen Salote later termed them as the 
"Reactionary Party". 77 
However it would be Queen Salote's legacy that she reunited Tonga. Political 
opposition was ironed out. Social issues were calmed by leading a renaissance of Tongan 
72 See Professor Guy Powles "The Early Accommodation of Traditional and English Law in Tonga" in P Herda 
(Ed) Tongan Culture and History (Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1990). [Powles] 
73 Latukefu, above n 66, 57-63. 
74 Latukefu, above n 66, 59. 
75 Wood-Ellem, above n 67, 28. 
76 See Re "Tonga Ma'a Tonga Kautaha" [1908-1959] l Tonga LR 5, 6. 
77 Wood-Ellem, above n 67, 7. 
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culture and values. Financial hardship was lessened with skilled governance. This was 
possible due to a variety of factors. Queen Salote was highly respected by the chiefs and 
people of Tonga because as a woman under Tongan culture she was afforded pre-eminent 
social status. As a woman of high chiefly rank she exercised privileges over most of the 
chiefs because of her lineage. Moreover, there was an increase of well educated personnel to 
help Queen Salote rule, in particular the Royal Consort, Tungi Mailefihi. 
Disaffection of chiefs also fizzled because of her marriage to Tungi Mailefihi. 
Socially the union unified the three ancient lines of kings: The Queen inherited the Tu 'i 
Kanokupolu title from her father, and was a direct descendent of the Tu 'i Tonga line through 
her mother; Tungi Mailefihi was the direct descendent of the Tu 'i Ha 'atakalaua line. Their 
children would therefore represent the union of the three dynasties returning the Tongan 
Monarchy to the highest social rank since the ancient Tu 'i Tonga kings. As a result of the 
calm that Queen Salote provided, the Constitution began to play a more prominent role in 
governing the affairs of the country. It also started the period where Tongan modem 
government was attaining a maturity that would end its British protectorate status in 1970 
under the present Monarch. 
In hindsight, it is clear that the radical political reforms of the past were instigated and 
engineered by the Monarchy. For the Tu 'i Tonga 's and the Tu 'i Ha 'atakalaua 's they 
preferred to distance the Monarchy from the headaches of every-day governance, to preserve 
the regal status of their respective offices but more importantly recognised the dissatisfaction 
of their subjects. For Tupou I, his granting of the Constitution was for the future of his people 
and land. Tupou II had to accept the protectorate status demanded by the British in order to 
protect Tonga. Queen Salote unified and calmed political opposition, and gifted the present 
Monarch with both strong social and political powers. The present Monarch faces the same 
challenges of dealing with political reform, and has already, to an extent, risen to the 
challenge by providing seats for elected representatives around the Executive table. The 
Monarch will therefore continue to be a source of ensuring political stability. The challenge 
for the present situation is the timeliness of Royal action. 
It is also evident that after all the political reforms of the past the sanctity of the 
Monarchy is preserved. Despite the limitations introduced by the rule of law, the stature of 
the Monarchy was maintained by the people. Over the years the people tacitly and expressly 
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accepted the concept of having a Monarchy. No reasonable justification has been made for its 
abolition. The Monarchy seems therefore to be a concept that Tongans will always retain. 
In summary, history reveals that Tongan political stability has always revolved around 
the Monarchy and the people. The Monarchy has made radical political change not only for 
its perennial benefit, but it has recognised since the ancient Tu 'i Tonga kings that change was 
necessary for the benefit of the people as well. Under the Tongan political structure the 
Monarchy must therefore co-exist with the people. The entities complement each other. The 
Monarchy provides stability through direction. The people provide legitimacy through 
recognition. It is imperative that this relationship should be observed at all times by both 
parties for the continued existence of the Tongan way of life. It will be seen that the modem 
form of Government introduced by Tupou I reflects this relationship. 
B The Modern Form of Government 
The Constitution of Tonga today is slightly different from the original Constitution. 
However, the amendments made over the years did not alter its structure or substance. The 
Constitution is an entrenched statute officially citied as the Act of the Constitution of Tonga. 
There are 3 parts to the Constitution: the Declaration of Rights; the Form of Government; and 
the Land. The first and second parts only are relevant to this paper. 
The Government is divided into three bodies: 78 The Executive, which consists of the 
King, Privy Council and Cabinet; the Legislative Assembly, the law making entity; and the 
Judiciary, comprising the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court, the Magistrates' Court and the 
Land Court. 
I The Declaration of Rights 
The Declaration of Rights entrenches basic human rights that the Executive is 
obligated to respect and enforce. The first clause guarantees freedom to all Tongans and any 
person who visits Tonga.79 The other basic rights include: freedom from slavery; equal 
application of the law; freedom of worship; freedom of expression; freedom to petition the 
78 The Constitution, above n 1, cl 30. 
79 The Constitution, above n 1, cl I . 
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King and the Legislative Assembly; freedom to meet peaceably and discuss petitions; the law 
of habeas corpus; due process; right to jury trial; double jeopardy; unbiased judiciary; 
justified search warrants; Government impartiality; Government protection of life, liberty and 
property; and prohibition of retrospective laws. 80 
These rights could be deemed collectively as laws relating to liberty. Under clause 79 
laws concerning liberty are fully entrenched and can never be repealed. However according 
to the decision in Taione, the law of liberty can be repealed if clause 79 is first repealed by 
removing the protection given to those laws. 81 This position is consistent with the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy where no parliament can bind a future parliament. 
2 The Executive 
(i) The King: Political Royal Prerogative Powers 
Under clause 31 the form of government is a Constitutional Government under the 
Monarch and "his heirs and successors". Under clause 41 the person of the Monarch is 
"sacred" and "governs the country but his ministers are responsible". In the event of travel 
overseas the Monarch has to appoint a Prince Regent, who takes over all royal duties until the 
Monarch's return. Royal powers have been exercised regularly by the Regent. 
As mentioned above Tupou I relinquished his authoritarian powers when he granted 
the Constitution. However some royal prerogative powers were maintained and some were 
created for the operation of a modem government. These include the royal prerogative to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus in times of war and rebellion, 82 conscripting military 
service, 83 the right to consent to marriages of heirs to the throne, 84 the right to make treaties 
with Foreign States 85 conferring titles of honour and honourable distinctions, 86 declaring 
martial law in times of civil war with another state,87 and the right to grant land to nobles.88 
80 The Constitution, above n l, cls 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20. 
81 Taione, above n 30, 17. 
82 The Constitution, above n l, cl 9. 
83 The Constitution, above n I, cl 22. 
84 The Constitution, above n I, cl 33. 
85 The Constitution, above n I, cl 39. 
86 The Constitution, above n I, cl 44. 
87 The Constitution, above n 1, cl 46. 
88 The Constitution, above n I, cl 104. 
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The main royal prerogative powers that are political in nature are powers to appoint a 
Prince Regent, 89 the power to appoint any other person to the Privy Council,90 the power to 
appoint and dismiss Ministers of the Crown and Governors, 91 the right to convoke and 
dissolve the Legislative Assembly, 92 the right to appoint the Speaker of the Legislative 
Assembly3 and the right to give royal assent or veto legislation.94 These will be discussed 
further below. 
(ii) The Privy Council 
The Monarch is the chair of the Privy Council, the highest executive body. 95 The 
Privy Council is therefore the source of all executive power. The Privy Council consists of all 
the Ministers of the Crown, and the two Governors of Vava'u and Ha'apai.96 The Monarch 
appoints the Ministers of the Crown and the Governors at his pleasure. The Monarch may 
also call on any other person to be a Privy Councillor. The Ministers and Governors therefore 
have no guarantee of tenure of office. 
Decisions made by the Privy Council, as confirmed by the Lali Media cases, are made 
collectively by the King and the Ministers. Executive decisions of the Privy Council are 
reviewable by the judiciary, however pure royal prerogative decisions are not. This 
arrangement is often criticised as providing opportunity for the Monarch to rule as he wishes 
because the Ministers are reluctant to disagree with the royal commands. Although that 
situation may arise constitutional checks and balances exist to prevent this. 
First, under the Constitution the King governs the land in accordance with the 
Constitution and the laws of Tonga. 97 The Judiciary therefore has the power to review 
executive decisions of the King and the Privy Councillors. Secondly, under the Constitution it 
is the Ministers who are responsible for executive decisions. Ministers are therefore aware 
89 The Constitution, above n l, cl 43. 
90 The Constitution, above n 1, cl 50( 1 ). 
91 The Constitution, above n I, cl 51 and 54. 
92 The Constitution, above n I, cl 56. 
93 The Constitution, above n 1, cl 61. 
94 The Constitution, above n I, cls 56 and 68. 
95 Government Act, above n 14, s 2. 
96 The Constitution, above n 1, cl 50(1) and 54. Governors are appointed by the Monarch with the consent of 
Cabinet: 
97 The Constitution, above n 1, cl 41. 
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that they may be held liable, albeit not personally, for unlawful decisions they support. 
Thirdly, the Privy Council has a legal advisor in the form of the Attorney General. 98 So 
although Executive power is overwhelmingly located in Privy Council, there are checks that 
are in place to prevent abuse. 
However lawful decisions may still be objectionable if made contrary to good 
governance principles. Again, there are Constitutional requirements in place. Under clause 17 
the Monarch is to govern "without partiality for the good of all the people" and not to "enrich 
or benefit any one man or one family". The office of the Commissioner for Public Relations, 
Tonga's equivalent of an Ombudsman, was established in 2002 to deal with complaints 
concerning the public service and public enterprises. 99 A Code of Conduct for the public 
service has also been approved under the Public Service Act 2002 and various public service 
strengthening projects have been implemented. 100 Good governance is therefore a priority of 
the Executive. However as will be seen below compliance is an issue. 
The Privy Council also has delegated legislative power as described above. 
Ordinances the Privy Council is able to make are limited to dealing with consequences that 
arise between meetings of the Legislative Assembly, the suspension of any law requested by 
the Chief Justice, giving effect to any treaty with a foreign country, enforcing the prerogative 
of the King proposed by the King or the authorisation of any extraordinary expenditure. Such 
Ordinances will become law upon promulgation however it must be presented in the next 
session of the Legislative Assembly for confirmation, amendment or rescission. 101 
The Privy Council also has judicial powers. It was once the highest Court of the land 
in relation to all matters except criminal matters. In 1966 an amendment to the Constitution 
was made to set up a Court of Appeal. However that amendment did not come into force until 
1990.102 The Privy Council, however, remains the last appellate court in relation to disputes 
98 Tonga has not always had the luxury of an abundance of Government lawyers, however up to 2004 it had four 
overseas qualified lawyers in Privy Council including the King who is a law graduate. At present there is only 
one overseas qualified lawyer in Cabinet but he is not the Attorney General 
99 Commissioner for Public Relations Act 200 I, s 11. 
JOO Public Service Act 2002, s 19. 
101 Government Act, above n 14, s 8. 
102 Act of Constitution of Tonga (Amendment) Act 1966 -Act 13 of 1966. Act 14 was the Court of Appeal Act 
1966 which came into force in 1990. The first Court of Appeal sat in the later parts of 1990 consisting of judges 
from New Zealand and Australia. 
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concerning hereditary estates and titles. In such an appeal the Chief Justice, the Monarch and 
the Privy Councillors constitute the Court. 
(iii) The Cabinet 
The Cabinet consists of the Ministers of the Crown and the two Governors. 103 The 
Cabinet is chaired by the Prime Minister. Throughout Tonga's modem history the Prime 
Minister has always been a member of the Royal Family, with the exception of three. 104 The 
present Prime Minister is the Monarch's youngest son. 
At present there are currently 13 Ministers of the Crown and the two Governors 
making 15 members of the Cabinet. Cabinet decisions are collective. All policy proposals are 
submitted to Cabinet by the relevant Ministry, and if required may be submitted to the Privy 
Council for final executive approval. Matters passed by Cabinet therefore already have the 
backing of the Ministers and Governors, and would only require the final decision of the 
King. However this does not bar some Ministers or Governors who may want to speak on the 
matter in the Privy Council. 
Ministers and Governors may be held directly accountable to the nobles and the 
people under clause 75 of the Constitution which provides for impeachment of any "Privy 
Councillor, Minister, Governor, or Judge" by the Legislative Assembly. Impeachment 
proceedings may be lodged on the grounds of "breaching laws or resolutions" of the 
Assembly, "maladministration, incompetency, destruction or embezzlement of Government 
property, or the performance of acts which may lead to difficulties" in foreign relations. This 
is a procedure that has not been effectively used against the Executive despite claims of 
Executive corruption. 
As the driver of Executive policy Cabinet has obviously taken the initiative to pursue 
both political and economic reforms. Cabinet has made significant strides to modernise the 
civil service by establishing a Commissioner for Public Relations, a Public Service 
LOJ The two Governors are members of Cabinet by virtue of section 12 of the Government Act, above n 14. 
'
04 Shirley Baker, 1880-1890, Solomone Ata, 1941-49 and Baron Vaea from 1991-1999. Members of the Royal 
Family who were Prime Ministers were HRH Prince Tevita 'Unga 1876-1880, Queen Salote Tupou IJI's 
Consort Tungi Mailefihi 1923 - 1941, the present King when he was still HRH Prince Tupouto' a-Tungi, I 949-
1965, the King's late younger brother HRH Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake 1965-1991 . 
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Commissio~105 public service training, corporatisation,106 reorganising public enterprises,107 
fiscal reform, financial-sector reform and private-sector reform, 108 and private sector 
strengthening. In February 2004 the Monarch began the appointment of senior public 
servants, usually the Head of Department, as Acting Ministers when a substantive Minister is 
away overseas. 1bis was to ensure that competent persons were always available to assist 
Privy Council and Cabinet, and also continue the work of the Ministry for the people. 
These developments provide optimism for the future. They are developments that 
provide a basis for providing accountability and transparency in the public sector. They were 
approved by the Executive confirming that the Executive is dedicated to responsible 
government and is willing to change the ways in which it operates. They were, moreover, 
confirmed in legislation suggesting that the Peoples' and Nobles' Representatives were 
supportive. However, one point that must be highlighted is that these developments were 
economic based and not strictly political in nature. 
3 The Legislative Assembly 
The Legislative Assembly is a tri-partite body consisting of representatives of the 
nobles, the people and the Executive. Nine representatives are elected by the nobles. They are 
elected by the 29 nobles who hold the 33 noble titles. 1bis includes the King who still holds 
the noble title Tungi, which he inherited from his father, and His Royal Highness the Crown 
Prince who holds the noble title Tupouto 'a, which is the title of the Heir Apparent. 109 The 
nobles are chiefs who were appointed by the Monarchy, and hold the titles based on the law 
of succession. 110 The Monarchy has no power to disentitle a noble' s title. 111 
105 Public Service Act 2002 
106 For example the communications sector was corporatised and competition introduced under the 
Communications Act 2000. 
107 Public Enterprises Act 2002. 
108 Public Finance Management Act 2002, Revenue Services Administration Act 2002, Consumption Tax Act 
2004. 
109 The Royal Estates Act (Cap. 6), s 4, Laws of Tonga (1988 Revised Edition). The current Prime Minister 
holds the titles of 'Ulukalala, Lavaka and Ata. No successor has been appointed to the title Ma'atu after the late 
Hon. Ma'atu, the King's second son who was disinherited for marrying without the Monarch's consent, passed 
away in 2004. The legitimate heir is still under the age of 21. No trustee has been appointed. 
110 The Constitution, above n 1, clause l l l. The title passes to the eldest legitimate male child of every 
titleholder. 
111 A noble's title only goes to the King for the appointment of a new noble, and that occurs when a noble is 
convicted of treason or sedition (clause 71) or when there are no legitimate heir to the noble title (clause 112). 
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The nine representatives elected to represent the people are elected by an estimated 
100,000 Tongan population living in Tonga 112 There are three members for the main island 
ofTongatapu, two representatives each for the respective island groups ofVava'u and 
Ha'apai, and one representative each for the respective smaller island groups of the Niuas and 
'Eua. The same distribution of seats exists for the Nobles' Representatives. 
The 15 members of the Executive appointed by the Monarch make up the Assembly 
and sit as nobles. 113 These are the only members of the Legislative Assembly appointed by 
the Monarch. At present there are a total of 33 seats in the Assembly. 
The Monarch has a power of veto over the laws passed by the Legislative Assembly. 
If the Monarch exercised his veto, the Legislative Assembly would be precluded from further 
discussing such laws until the next session. 114 The Monarch appoints the Speaker at his 
pleasure. 115 The Monarch also has the power to summon and dissolve the Legislative 
Assembly at his pleasure. 116 Under clause 69 the quorum of the Assembly is one-half of the 
membership. 
The main power of the Legislative Assembly is to pass legislation, including 
legislation that approves Government's budget and further supplements, the collection of 
taxes, and also approval, amendment or rescission of regulations. In addition, the Assembly: 
(a) may also impeach Ministers, Governors or judges for abuse of public office; 
(b) ''unseat" Representatives who are proven to have been elected based on threats 
and bribery; ll? 
( c) has the power to prosecute any person who commits offences against the 
Assembly; 118 
112 The last census in 1996 set a population of94,288 Tongans out ofa total of97,784: Tonga Statistics 
Deparbnent Website <http://www.spc.int> (last accessed 27 August 2005). Tongans living overseas have to 
travel to Tonga to register and vote. An estimated 100,000 Tongans live overseas mainly in New Zealand, 
Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan. 
113 The Constitution, above n l, cl 51. 
114 The Constitution, above n l, cl 68. The author knows of only two occasions when the veto was exercised. A 
law was introduced to take away land belonging to Tongans living overseas was vetoed. 1n 200 l the Princess 
Regent vetoed legislation that made amendments relating to jury trials. 
115 The Constitution, above n I, cl 61. 
116 The Constitution, above n I, cl 38. 
117 The Constitution, above n I, cl 66. 
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( d) receives annual reports of Government Ministries and Departments; an 
opportunity for the Representatives to evaluate Ministerial and Executive 
performance. Questions by Representatives are also a tool to abstract 
information from the Executive for the public; 
( e) conducts national visits twice a year to electorates and Government bodies to 
gather information and identify issues that require Assembly attention. 
The normal common law parliamentary privileges are available to members of the 
Assembly. Television and radio coverage of debates are available in summary. Minutes of the 
Assembly are published but only in the Tongan language. Media coverage is therefore rife 
and is of great interest to both the native and expatriate community. In the last session the 
Assembly underwent cosmetic developments to its infrastructure with the provision of offices 
for the Representatives. Planning is still underway for a new Assembly building. 
The main issue concerning the Legislative Assembly has been representation. Under 
clause 63 of the 1875 Constitution, the Legislative Assembly consisted of the Executive, the 
20 nobles appointed by the King, and 20 representatives of the people, and it met bi-
annually. 119 In 1914 however Tupou II amended the Constitution and reduced the number of 
representatives from 20 to seven each, and the Assembly was convened annually. The power 
of the Monarchy to appoint his Ministers however was not affected. This meant that the 
Monarchy possesses the ability to create and maintain a majority in the Assembly. In 1982 
the present Monarch amended the Constitution increasing the number of peoples' and nobles' 
representatives from seven to nine, but still retained the power to create a majority. 120 Before 
the appointment of the elected Ministers, the Monarchy has traditionally maintained the 
numbers of the Ministers at 12. 
118 The Constitution, above n l , cl 70 (as amended by Act 18 of 1999). The old clause 70 was last used in 1996 
when a Peoples' Representative and two journalists were sentenced to be imprisoned for 30 days for 
"disrespecting" the Assembly. The Supreme Court later declared the conviction and sentence unconstitutional: 
Moala & ors v Minister of Police (No. 3) [1996] Tonga LR 211 [Moala]. The result amended clause 70 in 1999 
to its present detailed fonn. In 2003 the Court of Appeal granted the representative and the two journalists 
normal and exemplary damages for the unlawful imprisonment: Edwards v Pohiva (Cross Appeal) [2003] 
TOCA 8 <www.paclii.org> (last accessed 28 August 2005) 
119 Latukefu, above n 66, I 03. 
120 Act 17 of 1982 increased the number of nobles and peoples representatives to the present number of 9. 
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The Executive was therefore always meant to be a minority government inside the 
Assembly. His Royal Highness the Crown Prince recently explained this feature of the 
Tongan Assembly while writing concerning the media reforms: 121 
Eventually, when all the mjnjsters are elected representatives, their numbers in parliament 
shall maintain proportions traditionally maintained in the past ie a minority in the house. 
Neither the People's Representatives nor the Nobility should alone have the ability to out vote 
the government but the government, alone, should never be permitted to out vote the Nobility 
and the People's representatives should they decide to vote together. This is necessary 
because Tonga does not have an Upper House and is a natural non-legislative restraint on the 
use of Executive power. Among the virtues of these reforms is that they can be implemented 
immediately without Constitutional change. 
The balance has served Tonga well for a century and a half. To change this formula would 
mean an alteration in the terms of the social contract which ended our Civil Wards and which 
manifests itself in our land tenure system. 
This "balance" is therefore a concept entrenched in Tongan governance. It may 
explain why ordinary legislation is passed only by simple majority three times rather than by 
special majority, except for the special rules in clause 79. 122 In order to pass legislation 
support from the other tables is therefore required. It should be noted however that when laws 
"relating to the King, the Royal Family or the titles and inheritances of nobles" only the 
nobles are allowed to discuss and vote on such laws. 123 
The impact on proceedings of the "balance" concept is that the Peoples' 
Representatives effectively play the role of the opposition party, and the Nobles 
Representatives hold the balance of power. This has been attributed to the occupation by the 
supporters of the "Human Rights and Democracy Movement in Tonga" of most of the seats 
at the Peoples' table, thus often presenting a united and constant opposition to the Executive 
when required. The Nobles, in contrast to the other two tables, vote on an individual basis, 
which is sometimes difficult to predict. This was demonstrably lucid during the voting in the 
Assembly for the media reform bills. The Executive were united in their stance for the media 
121 Matangi Tonga Online, Letter to the Editor by His Royal Highness Crown Prince Tupouto'a "Edwards 
Interview: Media Bills had become a cause celebre" dated 25 January 2005 <http://www.matangitonga.to> (last 
accessed l I March 2005) 
122 The Constitution, above n I, cls 56 and 79. 
123 The Constitution, above n l, cl 67. 
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reform bills and represented 12 out of the 30 votes. The Peoples' Representatives were all 
against the media reform bills, and with one of their number being absent overseas, they had 
only eight votes. The Executive needed four votes from the Nobles. During the voting four 
Nobles' Representatives supported the bills, and three Nobles' Representatives voted against. 
One Nobles' Representative was absent, and one chaired the Whole Committee during the 
voting. With the increase of the Executive table to 15, a simple majority is now 17, which is 
an easier threshold for the Executive to achieve legislative latitude. 
4 The Judiciary 
The Monarch appoints the judges of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court with 
the consent of the Privy Council. 124 The Chief Justice is the head of the judiciary as the 
President of the Court of Appeal, and sits in that Court with three other justices.125 The Chief 
Justice ordinarily sits in the Supreme Court as does a second Supreme Court Judge. 126 Both 
judges of the Supreme Court also sit in the Land Court, along with a Land Assessor to 
provide assistance on Tongan customs. 127 The judges of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court have always been expatriates which hopefully will continue in the future. 128 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is cast very wide to include "all cases in Law 
and Equity arising under the Constitution and the laws of the Kingdom", and "land matters" 
are dealt with by the Land Court. 129 Clause 82 provides the Judiciary the power to strike 
down legislation: 
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Kingdom and if any other law is inconsistent with the 
Constitution, that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. 
The Chief Justice was a member of the Privy Council as legal advisor after the 1875 
Constitution,130 and at times was allowed to sit in the Legislative Assembly. 131 During Queen 
124 The Constitution, above n 1, cls 85 and 86. 
125 Burchett J of Australia, and Tompkins and Salmon JJ of New Zealand. 
126 Ford J of New Zealand. 
127Land Act (Cap. 132), s 146 (as amended) laws of Tonga (1988 Revised Edition) 
128 Ward Interview, above n 27, 5. 
129 The Constitution, above n 1, cl 90. 
130 Latukefu, above n 66, 100. This was under clause 54 of the 1875 Constitution. 
131 See Powles, above n 72. 
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Salote's reign the Chief Justice was however removed from the Privy Council in 1942 for 
obvious reasons. 132 
The mrun issue for Tonga's judiciary is maintaining expatriates as judges, and 
appropriate technical support. After the Lali Media decisions in the Supreme Court there 
were calls from the public for the dismissal of the Chief Justice based on a supposed 
Executive anomaly in the procedure used to approve the Chief Justice's salary from previous 
years, and impeachment proceedings were threatened but never carried out. 133 The 
proponents called for the appointment of Tongan judges. Their heavy criticism of the Chief 
Justice resulted in the instigation of contempt of court prosecutions. 134 However the pressure 
eased when the Chief Justice resigned and took up an offer as President of the Fiji Court of 
Appeal. 135 After the departure of the Chief Justice the call for changes in appointments 
interestingly disappeared and Government appointed another expatriate as the present Chief 
Justice. This episode and the political impact of the Taione case raised the question of judicial 
independence. To most people the judiciary is seen as the last bastion in enforcing the 
Constitution and protecting rights. 136 The Taione case protected the public's right of freedom 
of expression. Another vivid example was when the Supreme Court in 1996 declared 
unconstitutional the imprisonment for 30 days of a Peoples' Representative and two 
journalists by the Legislative Assembly for contempt under clause 70. 137 It is therefore vital 
for the judiciary is allowed freedom from any social or political pressure to make the legally 
tough decisions. 
To its credit the Executive recognise this. The Executive is devoted to providing the 
necessary technical support to improve the prestige of the Tongan judiciary. Refurbished 
court facilities have been provided under Australian funding, and a new court building is 
underway together with judicial strengthening projects. It should be noted that these 
improvements had been planned several years before. The Executive also ensures reasonable 
132 Latukefu, above n 66, 81. Act 25 of 1942. 
133 'Etuate Lavulavu MP and Mumui Tatola, "Check it Out" Oceania Broadcasting Network, 19, 21, 26, and 27 
May 2003. 
134 Attorney General v Lavulavu and ors, Cr. 329/03, Nuku'alofa Supreme Court Registry. 
m Matangi Tonga Online "Tonga's laws are there to protect the people who have no power: Justice Ward" 
<http://www.matangitonga.to/article/features/interviews/article _print_ ward020704.shtml> (last accessed l l 
March 2005) 
136 Ward Interview, above n 27, 5. 
137 Moala, above n 118. 
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remuneration is provided to maintain quality judges. The Attorney General is also vigorous in 
upholding the law of contempt of court. 138 
Recently the Executive agreed to the appointment of two New Zealand District Court 
judges who separately served three months appointments under New Zealand funding to help 
clear a substantive backlog of cases in the Supreme Court. The private bar consists mainly of 
locally qualified lawyers. 139 There are a few tertiary qualified lawyers, but most are employed 
by the Executive or based overseas. The Tongan Law Society has enrolled most of the locally 
qualified lawyers on a correspondence course from the United Kingdom to study for law 
degrees. Library facilities for lawyers are modest and access to electronic legal databases is 
scant. 
Despite the apparent technical weaknesses in the judiciary, the future appears 
favourable, and judicial independence in Tonga is virtually guaranteed. 
C Challenging the Executive 
The above description of the present form of Tonga' s government illustrates that the 
King remains the central political authority in Tonga. The opportunity for the Monarchy to 
rule as it wishes is vividly present. Fortunately, that power has not been utilised to the 
extreme, as in dictatorial systems of modem times. Moreover, the judiciary remains an 
effective check on the Executive and the rest of government. Reverence for the rule of law 
therefore continues to be a cornerstone of Tonga. This has been complemented by the 
progressive modernisation of the Judiciary and the Legislative Assembly. The theme was also 
taken to unexpected level with the Executive' s decision to undergo slight restructuring. This 
is hardly a sign of an absolute monarchy, or authoritarian or feudalist government. The social 
contract was therefore Monarchy and its people therefore were intended to co-exist in 
harmony. The social contract was that the Monarch governs for the people and, the people 
138 Contempt of court law is still based on the common law and it has been accepted by the Court of Appeal as 
an exception to freedom of expression: see Namoa v Attorney- General [2000] TOCA 14 <www.paclii.org> 
(last accessed 27 August 2005) There have been l O contempt of court cases since 1998. Two have been 
scandalising the court and four have been interference with the administration of justice cases. Four cases have 
yet to be adjudicated. 
139 Locally qualified lawyers are local persons who were admitted to the bar after passing law exams set by the 
judges. They were appointed to provide a legal profession for the public in the first half of the 20th century. The 
last was appointed around 2002. The appointments in the 1980s hold diplomas in law from the University of the 
South Pacific. 
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enjoy the governance of the Monarchy. The Constitution would then provide the foundation 
to quell any injustice through the judiciary. 
Tonga's form of government however does not possess the normal features of 
responsible government under the Westminster system. This is clearly so in three areas. The 
Ministers are appointed by royal favour, rather then being elected and periodically subject to 
change at elections. Secondly, the Monarch exercises ultimate freedom in exercising his 
political prerogative powers such as in appointing Ministers and giving royal assent to 
legislation. Thirdly, the representation in the Assembly is disproportionate to the population, 
although based on a "balanced" proportion. This form of government is unique to Tonga and 
is a hybrid of the Westminster system and Tongan culture. It is what the Constitution terms as 
a "Constitutional Government under" the Monarch. 140 
These are the exact features of the Tongan system that is targeted by political 
reformists. The problem however may not be structural, but the ways in which the system has 
been used. According to Campbell it was ''the quality of governance, not the directions of 
development" that created the political reformists. 141 The last three decades were beleaguered 
with political dissension relating to nepotism, favouritism, passport sales, "royalised" 
government entities, 142 satellite slots, extravagant per diems, lack of financial reporting, 
failed projects, loss of investments and conflicts of interests. 
Dissension was initially voiced through radio programmes and newspapers in the late 
1970s and 1980s. In 1992 it became more visible with the fust pro-democracy conference 
held in Tonga, followed by seminars, meetings and follow-up conferences but on a smaller 
scale. 143 With the introduction of television in the late 1990s a more wide-ranging medium 
became available. Today all media are frequently used to advocate political change and as a 
result the public are more politically conscious. Elections have constantly returned candidates 
who stand for political reform and have cruelly disposed those who have opposed the 
reformists or who failed to pursue reform once inside the Assembly. However, according to 
140 The Constitution, above n 1, cl 3 l. 
141 Ian C. Campbell "The Quest for Constitutional Reform in Tonga" (2005) 40(1) Journal of Pacific History 91 , 
97. [Campbell] 
142 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee Inquiry into New Zealand's relationship with the Kingdom of 
Tonga August 2005, 29. 
143 Matangi Tonga Online, "Human Rights seminar looks at Constitutional Monarchy" 21 July 2004 
<http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 17 August 2005). 
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James voting for the political reformists "does not mean that the nation is crying out for the 
changes they have in mind let alone a fully-fledged, Western-style form of government". 144 
James premises this on the decreasing number of voter interest and votes for the political 
reformists in the five elections between 1990 and 2002. In the 2005 general election however 
the political reformists gained more support by winning eight of the nine Peoples' 
Representative seats. 145 
Recently reformists are becoming more organised by regularly petitioning the 
Legislative Assembly and the Monarch, and using television, protests marches and appeals to 
foreign governments to publicise their cause. Some reformists have created political parties 
recognising success is more likely to be achieved by presenting a united front as a party 
rather then standing as individuals. 146 
The biggest protest so far has been the recent six week industrial action by aggrieved 
public servants as a result of the Executive's recent salary revision exercise. Although the 
revision was genuinely based on economic reforms, its implementation was derisory and 
presented a foul perception of Ministerial self-interests. The strike was therefore never a 
political strike but with the stalemate in negotiations it became a platform for political 
reform. Some students resorted to vandalism and arson. 147 In Auckland Tongan expatriates 
were involved in a melee with staff at the Royal Residence while the King was in 
residence. 148 A historical royal residence was burnt down in Tonga. The Princess Regent 
twice visited the strikers to persuade them to return to work, and outsiders assessed that the 
Kingdom was "crumbling". 149 
144 James, above n 51 , 322. 
145 Matangi Tonga Online "Results of the Tongan General Elections" 18 March 2005 
<http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 19 March 2005) 
146 Matangi Tonga Online "Tonga's first political party registers" 13 July 2005 <http://www.matangitonga.to> 
(last accessed 18 July 2005). There have however been groups with political objectives such as the Human 
Rights and Democracy Movement in Tonga (a pro-democracy movement still trying to register) and the Kotoa 
Movement (pro-monarchists group that is no longer active). 
147 Matangi Tonga Online, "Students smash Tonga College as Govt removes striking principal and head tutor" 
17 August 2005 <www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 27 August 2005) 
148 See Angela Gregory "Protests turns ugly at royal residence" (22 August 2005) The New Zealand Herald, 
Auckland, A3, Nick Venter "It's no picnic for Tonga strikers" (23 August 2005) The Dominion, Wellington, A6. 
149 See Nick Venter "King's old house burns to ground" (24 August 2005) The Dominion, Wellington, A3 ; Nick 
Venter "Royal plea at strike demo" (26 August 2005) The Dominion, Wellington, A3 ; and Nick Venter "The 
Crumbling Kingdom" (27 August 2005) The Dominion, Wellington, El . 
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Fortunately an agreement between the Executive and the public servants was reached. 
The Executive agreed to accept the demands of the strikers for salary increase and, due 
mainly to the stalemate in negotiations, "consideration" would be given to setting up a 
"Royal Commission to review the Constitution to allow for a more democratic 
government". 150 
Following the resolution of the strike the political reformists continued the 
momentum by organising a large political march. It culminated in the submission to the 
Palace Office of a petition to the Monarch calling for the dismissal of all the Ministers and 
also full democratic reforms. 151 A second petition was also submitted requesting the Monarch 
to authorise a referendum on democratic reform. The Monarch however has not responded to 
the petitions. As a result the reformists have decided to carry out an unofficial referendum. 
These incidents illustrate that constant airing of political dissension and the ignoring 
of opportunities for constructive dialogue may lead to unwanted violence. Mass violence and 
lawlessness however remains unlikely due to the apparent unity and overwhelming 
preference for peaceful protest. However that should not mean complacency and political 
dissension should therefore be treated more seriously by both the dissidents and the 
conformists. 
Proposals for political reform are united in calls for responsible government in the 
Executive. 152 Political reformist front their proposals based on change to the political 
architecture however, the core desire is for political leaders to practice good governance. It is 
the perceived decadence of the leadership that is fuelling political dissension. As Campbell 
has assessed, the reformists "care about the outcomes, not about the process or structure".153 
However for those who want to ensure desired "outcomes" the appropriate structure must 
150 Matangi Tonga OnJine "Strike ends! PSA signs MOU caJJing for democratic reforms" 4 September 2005 
<http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 6 September 2005). 
151 Matangi Tonga OnJine "Big March for dismissal of Tongan Prime Minister'' 6 September 2005 
<http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 6 September 2005). 
152 See Matangi Tonga Online "PDP calls for elected Prime Minister'' 11 August 2005 
<http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 17 August 2005); Matangi Tonga Online "Lopeti pushes for 
Tongan Constitutional Review" 3 February 2005 <http://www.matangitonga.to> (last accessed 17 August 
2005); Lopeti Senituli "Basic Proposal for an Alternative Structure of Government for Tonga (Draft 4)"30 
August 2002 <http://www.planet-tonga.com> (last accessed 6 June 2005), William Clive Edwards "Proposal for 
Constitutional Changes to Provide for a DemocraticaJly Elected Government for the People of Tonga" 27 JuJy 
2005 <http://planet-tonga.com (last accessed 13 September 2005) 
153 Campbell, above n 141, 102. 
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also exist. Structural change may therefore be necessary. Although the Executive has 
implemented measures towards achieving some responsible government, they obviously are 
insufficient as illustrated by the increase in recent petitions, public protests and sporadic 
violence. 154 The reformists and their supporters have therefore highlighted their core political 
need is to have an Executive established in a political structure that provides for 
accountability, transparency and the rule of law. 
In order to ensure peaceful existence and to continue the perpetual state of stability, 
the Monarchy and the Executive must fully appreciate the reformists' stance and the risks of 
inadequate dialogue and responses. They must provide opportunities for constructive 
dialogue and be prepared for some comprise, particularly to the structure of the Executive. 
On the other hand, the dissidents should fully appreciate the traditionally entrenched political 
values held by the Monarchy and most Tongans, and voice their views constantly in a 
peaceful and composed manner. That is the Tongan way. That is the way that would obtain 
support from the people, and endorsement from the aristocracy. That is the way to share 
power with the Monarchy. That would be the peaceful way. 
IV WHERE TO NOW? 
A Principles of Tongan Governance 
Based on the recent developments, the history of Tongan governance and the current 
political climate the author can identify the following principles that should in form be part of 
any change to Tonga's form of government. However, it must be recognised that under the 
current Constitutional arrangements, and Tongan culture, Constitutional change for Tonga's 
political structure will be given effect only by the Monarchy. The Monarchy has the power to 
change the Constitution at his whim, of course subject to the Constitution. Some view it 
involving "quite emphatic change of royal heart" and "appears equally unlikely" from the 
present Monarch and the next. 155 The recent unexpected developments in the Executive call 
those views into question however. The recent developments illustrate change is possible, but 
that ·t must be in the interests of the Monarchy and the people together. 
154 For example, the Commissioner for Public Relations Act 200 I established Tonga's version of an 
Ombudsman, but it only has powers to make non-binding recommendations to the Privy Council. 
155 James, above n 51,315. 
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First, the cultural structure of authority has to be recognised but not replicated in a 
political structure. Tongan custom is embedded in Tongans and cannot be disregarded in any 
Tongan form of government. The cultural structure is vertical with the King at its head and 
the nobles and the people occupying the lower levels. The political structure must recognise 
these entities, but be horizontal with equal participation of the King, the nobles and the 
people on a level playing field. The infinite wisdom of the makeup of the Legislative 
Assembly illustrates this best with neither table ever being guaranteed the ability to out-vote 
the other two tables. Having one group more powerful than the other creates tyranny of the 
majority, and, for Tonga's small size, fragile economy and populist voters, it would provide a 
shorter pathway to instability and unrest. 
Secondly, the Executive should be represented on a tripartite basis: the King, the 
Nobles and the people. Governance should therefore be shared. It allows the people and the 
nobles to feel involved and share responsibility in decision making. The appointment of 
elected Ministers illustrates this is acceptable to the Monarchy. Coalition Governments 
around the world have proven that parties with different interests can work together and 
provide uniform policy. The concept of a shared Executive should therefore be retained. 
Thirdly, the obvious political climate shows that a responsible government is 
tantamount to stable government. Having an Executive that is accountable to its Monarch and 
people, and is transparent in decision making, produces less temperate political dissension. 
Leaders who appoint, and who are appointed, must strictly adhere to good governance 
principles. Human frailties of course may explain and allow for minor non-compliance 
however current practices that exist in Tonga must be seriously improved, and that applies to 
all levels of government. The Executive has made some strides towards good governance. 
The issue now is embedding the principles of good governance in every person in 
government: Ministers, heads of departments and public servants. It may be wise to take up 
the recommendation by James and Tufui to educate all about anti-corruption practices, 
identify the costs of corruption, strengthen relevant offices and institutions to implement anti-
corruption practices, enforce existing rules and regulations, identify and deal with conflict 
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between rules and culture and use role models to help change attitudes about corruption. 156 
This should ensure compliance with good governance principles inside the Executive. 
Last but not least, judicial independence is vital. Government recognises this and 
should continue to vigorously provide technical support and protection of the judiciary. At 
the moment it may be best to continue the appointment of expatriates in order to provide an 
independent and more objective stance especially during this evolution process. Tongans 
have always revered and respected the judiciary because of their historical culture of 
subjection to authority. Although there have been signs of some discontent with the judiciary, 
public confidence in the judiciary will be maintained by political dissidents since it is the 
only weapon they have in limiting Executive power. 
B Options for a New Form of Government 
What form of government then could provide these principles of cultural identity, 
shared governance, good governance and judicial independence? Three options may be 
considered: retention of the existing system, shared governance or full democracy. 
1 Retention of the Existing System 
Retaining the form of government before the appointment of elected Ministers may be 
an option. Since it has been identified that the political problem has been about leadership 
rather than structure, and that the current arrangement is still experimental in nature, this 
option is still a possibility. The old system has worked for Tonga since 1875, and it is only 
recently that popular vociferous call for reform has erupted due to public immorality in 
leadership. 
It would therefore be imperative for militating political dissension to abide strictly 
with principles of good governance and uphold judicial independence. Personnel in 
government must have a new direction. Decision-making practices must be improved and 
made more transparent. Relationships with the Peoples' and Nobles' Representatives should 
156 Kerry James and Taniela Tufui National Integrity Systems: Transparency International Country Study 
Report: Tonga 2004 (Transparency International Australia and Asia Pacific School of Economics and 
Governance, ANU, Canberra, 2004) 
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be more consultative rather then confrontational. The Executive should also be more 
appreciative and timely in its response to criticism. The Executive should basically make 
itself politically and socially conspicuous instead of passively consigning itself behind closed 
doors when political incidents occur. The Executive must appreciate that the public does not 
only emotionally criticise but expects responses that are appreciative with reasonable and 
composed explanations. Such responses would go a long way to quelling dissension. 
Under the present Constitutional arrangements Ministers may be held accountable to 
the elected Representatives through dismissal from office after impeachment in the 
Legislative Assembly under clause 75(5) of the Constitution. If there are genuine claims of 
mismanagement and corruption, this avenue should be pursued vigorously. Elected 
representatives should therefore ensure reliable and admissible evidence is gathered if 
impeachment proceedings are to be pursued. Petitions to the Legislative Assembly and the 
Monarch and legal action are other avenues, and can only be effective once a credible case is 
built. 
In summary the present Constitutional arrangements provide avenues for 
accountability but they have not been effectively used. Moreover, until there is conviction to 
good governance principles through concrete political manifestos or regulation, it could be 
justifiable to retain the existing system. Amendments or new legislation are therefore 
unnecessary, and this would be the most cost effective option. 
2 Shared Governance 
This option involves the equal participation of the Monarch, the nobles and people in 
the Executive. This seems to be the system being considered after the appointment of the 
elected Ministers. This concept however may be developed further as follows: First, the 
number of the Nobles and Peoples Representatives could be increased to 12 each. This could 
be done by adding one representative each to the three main electorates of Tongatapu, 
Ha'apai and Vava'u. The Monarch could then appoint the Prime Minister from the elected 
representatives of the nobles and the people. The Prime Minister then selects six 
representatives each from the Nobles' and Peoples' Representatives to be appointed by the 
Monarch as Ministers of the Crown. These 12 representatives and the Prime Minister would 
form the Executive. 
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The selected Nobles' and Peoples' Representatives will therefore have to resign and 
be appointed as Ministers. They could then be replaced by the next candidate in their 
respective electorates with the most votes, rather then going through a time consuming and 
costly by-election. Candidates for the Nobles' and Peoples' representative seats must be 
prepared to accept the possibility of being appointed a Minister. The nobles and the people 
who vote must understand that they should vote for candidates who have the ability to work 
in the Executive for the country as a whole. The total number of the Executive would be 13 
but would still be a minority government in the 37 seat Legislative Assembly. The Monarchy 
would still retain its seat in the Executive but will participate equally with the Nobles and 
Peoples' representatives who are appointed Ministers. 
To ensure accountability, elections could continue to be held tri-annually. The Prime 
Minister however may not serve for longer than three concurrent terms. Elected Ministers 
may retain office depending on maintaining their mandate and selection by the Prime 
Minister. The Prime Minister could have the power to dismiss all Ministers, with the consent 
of the King. If this happens a replacement could be selected from the Representatives, but a 
by-election should be conducted to replace the selected Representative. The Prime Minister 
could be accountable to the King, through a vote of confidence or impeachment by the 
Legislative Assembly, or conviction of an offence punishable by imprisonment for a term of 
not less than 2 years. 
Emphasising limited tenure and equal participation should ease political dissension 
regarding the absence of ability to change and influence the membership and policies of the 
Executive. On the other hand, the Monarchy will still retain the authority to appoint and 
dismiss Ministers, and will govern with Ministers who are accountable and therefore 
prepared to "speak out". More importantly members of such a government would find it in 
their best interests to be acute with good governance principles. Most of the cost would 
involve amending the Constitution, the Government Act, the Legislative Assembly Act and 
the Electoral Act 1989. It is submitted though that this is a cost that is miniscule compared to 
the profits of an effective and stable government. 
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3 Full Democracy 
This option involves the King no longer being directly involved in the Executive but 
retains the power to veto legislation passed by the Legislative Assembly. Veto power 
naturally accompanies the ceremonial role to give royal assent to legislation. Such power 
should therefore be real to recognise the stature of the Tongan Monarchy. The present 
Monarchy has proven that the veto power is used sparingly. However a significant safeguard 
may be imposed where the veto could only be exercised if the Monarch is petitioned by a 
substantial number of the population, or the Monarch deems the matter serious enough to be 
determined by referendum. This should ensure the veto will be exercised only in very 
exceptional circumstances fully justified by extra-democratic means. Retention by the 
Monarchy of veto power therefore recognises the Monarchy as representing Tonga as a 
whole if all the normal government hurdles fail to stop inappropriate legislation. 
The Government will therefore be elected by the nobles and the people. Based on the 
experiences of New Zealand when it used a first-past-the-post system to elect its members of 
Parliament, it may be appropriate to have a mixed member proportion system to continue the 
theme of "balance" that is the basis of the current Legislative Assembly. 157 The composition 
of the Legislative Assembly will therefore have to be changed, and seats distributed in 
proportion to the various island groups. Party politics would therefore have to thrive, and the 
normal avenues of accountability should be established and used. All interests of the 
commoners, women, religion, the aristocracy, businesses, churches and maybe the youth, 
should therefore be represented, and with Tonga's homogenous ethnic population, race would 
not complicate representation. 
The major benefit is that government will be totally accountable to the masses and 
strictly adhere to good governance. The Monarch will still be head of state and maintain some 
influence politically through conditional veto of legislation. However the hurdle is excluding 
the Monarch from the Executive. It is uncertain how Tongans would handle this. Tongans are 
still generally monarchists and to remove the Monarchy entirely from executive decision 
making may be too big a step. 
157 Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand's Constitution and Government (4ed, 
Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004) 9-18. 
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C Methods of Implementation 
The method of implementation would be vital. First, it may be done incrementally 
until Tonga is comfortable with its system. The disadvantage is the duration and limited 
patience people may have. The benefit is that a system is produced at the end which has been 
proven to work. 
Secondly, a Royal Commission may be established with a mandate to identify 
appropriate options for forms of government within a prescribed time period of two to three 
years. 158 These options should then be presented to the public to decide by referendum. The 
vital issue however is to ensure that people make informed rather than populist decisions. 
Vigorous education strategies must then be tirelessly implemented before any referendum. 
The disadvantages of a Royal Commission are ensuring independent and representative 
membership, limited consultation, untested options and costs. The benefits are public 
legitimisation and more informed decision making. 
Thirdly, the Monarch could decide the model and make changes. Like the Monarch's 
ancestors, radical change can be implemented based on the Monarchy's beliefs of what is in 
the best interests of the people and peace. The disadvantages are likely to be the lack of 
consultation with the wider public, the possibility of self-interest and uncertainty as to when 
changes will occur. The benefit is that such a decision could be well thought out because the 
Monarchy appreciates that what is in the best interest of the Monarchy should be in the best 
interest of the people, and vice versa. It would be less costly in the planning process. 
Whatever means that is adopted to implement political change to the form of 
government, it is submitted that it would be preferable that it be legitimised with 
overwhelming support of the Monarch and the public, and that it be, at the same time 
appropriate to Tonga by providing for cultural identity, shared governance, good governance 
and judicial independence. 
158 The Royal Commissions Act (Cap. 41) Laws o/Tonga (1988 Revised Edition), s 2. There have been three 
Roya] Commfasions. In 1983 two Royal Commissions were established to separately look at the now defunct 
Tonga Commodities Board and at land practices, usage and law. In 2003 a Royal Commission was established 
to inquire into the now liquidated Royal Tongan Airlines. 
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V CONCLUSION 
This paper has explained the recent constitutional developments that occurred in 
Tonga from February 2003 to April 2005, comprising the Lali Media decisions of former 
Chief Justice Ward and the Court of Appeal concerning the bans on the Taimi 'o Tonga 
newspaper, the Taione decision of the present Chief Justice concerning the Constitutional 
amendments and media reform legislation, the reshuffling of Cabinet and the appointment of 
elected Ministers. From these developments it was ascertained that first, shared governance is 
acceptable. Secondly, firm accountability of Ministers is pursued. Thirdly, judicial 
independence is respected. 
This paper then analysed the historical background of Tongan government, and the 
present form of government and its operation. From this analysis it was found that Tonga has 
always endured political dissension and that the Monarchy has been responsible for 
maintaining a stable country. Moreover, significant developments have been made in the 
interests of good governance and modernisation of Tonga's government. The political climate 
however illustrates these are not sufficient. The main concern is constant compliance. 
Based on the recent developments, the history of Tongan governance and the present 
political climate it was submitted that any form of government in the future should provide 
for the principles of cultural identity, shared governance, good governance and judicial 
independence. Three options were considered and the modes of implementing change were 
discussed. 
Tonga is now taking the challenging road of reform after 130 years of modem 
government. Fortunately, preference is for peaceful change; although there has been small 
scale violence by isolated groups, not supported by the public, who are, perhaps nai've in the 
ways of the Kingdom. Although the recent constitutional developments have been a catalyst 
for constitutional change, one hopes that change will be timely and certain. The challenge 
now is to take the lessons from these developments and from Tonga's heritage to heart and to 
consider reforms positively. Patience and leadership will be the most important virtues for 
Tongans during these times. 
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